New Delhi: Yemen’s internationally recognized government has opened a multi-front counteroffensive against the Iran-aligned Houthis, declaring that the recapture of Sanaa is its ultimate objective as the country slides towards its most serious fighting since the 2022 truce. The renewed campaign is also developing into a contest for control of the approaches to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime passages.
Fighting intensified on Sunday, across al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Taiz and Hodeidah after government-aligned forces attempted to reverse a Houthi offensive towards the Red Sea coast. The Houthis had sought to advance through western Taiz and southern Hodeidah towards the port of Mocha and the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.
Government forces reported advances towards the outskirts of Dhi Na’im district in al-Bayda and across several positions in al-Jawf, which provides one of the principal approaches to Houthi-controlled Sanaa. The Houthis disputed those accounts, saying they had halted a large offensive near the al-Labanat mountains and attacked incoming reinforcements with ballistic missiles.
Major General Samir al-Sabri, Yemen’s deputy defence minister, said the government had decided to retake Sanaa, which the Houthis seized in 2014 after rejecting a Gulf-backed political transition. Government military representatives also warned civilians to avoid important routes linking the capital with Marib and al-Jawf, suggesting that preparations could extend beyond the current frontline battles.
However, the declarations do not mean that government troops are close to entering Sanaa, where the Houthis have spent more than a decade consolidating their military and political control. Yemen’s mountainous terrain, entrenched tribal networks and the group’s missile and drone arsenal could make any advance towards the capital slow, costly and difficult to sustain.
Government seeks to overturn divided status quo
The counteroffensive follows a major reorganization of the anti-Houthi camp after government-aligned forces regained areas of southern Yemen previously controlled by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council. That development enabled the Presidential Leadership Council to present its disparate armed factions as a more unified force operating under a clearer command structure.
Saudi Arabia has supported this consolidation with political pressure and substantial financial assistance, including money for the salaries of Yemeni troops and civil servants. Riyadh reportedly budgeted nearly $3 billion for Yemen in 2026 as part of its effort to bring rival armed formations under state authority and stabilize territory outside Houthi control.
The chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, said government forces had regained the initiative, but battlefield claims from either side remain difficult to verify independently. The Houthis retain control of most of Yemen’s populous northwest, including Sanaa, Hodeidah and their northern stronghold of Saada.
Even if government troops make substantial gains, the Houthis could withdraw into the highlands surrounding Saada, Hajjah and Sanaa, where geography has repeatedly frustrated larger and better-equipped forces. Such an outcome could divide Yemen into more clearly defined northern and southern military blocs without producing a decisive end to the war.
Bab al-Mandeb becomes a strategic prize
The battle has acquired wider international importance because the Houthis and government forces are also competing for the coastal approaches to Bab al-Mandeb. The strait carries shipping between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Red Sea and Suez Canal, making it critical to trade between Asia and Europe.
Its importance has increased further as restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted energy shipments from the Gulf during the wider conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel. Serious disruption at both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb would squeeze two major maritime arteries simultaneously, forcing more vessels to take the longer and more expensive route around southern Africa.
The Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi shipping in July and warned commercial operators that vessels using Saudi ports could be targeted wherever they came within the group’s operational reach. Two tankers carrying Saudi oil subsequently changed course in the Red Sea, illustrating how warnings alone can influence shipping decisions and insurance costs.
The group has already demonstrated its ability to threaten merchant vessels in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and parts of the Arabian Sea with missiles, drones and explosive-laden boats. Its attacks since November 2023 have repeatedly compelled shipping companies to divert vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding time and expense to trade between Europe and Asia.
Control of the western Yemeni coast would therefore have consequences extending well beyond the domestic balance of power. For the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia, securing the coastline is central to protecting Red Sea commerce; for the Houthis, proximity to the shipping channel provides strategic leverage against Riyadh and its Western partners.
Saudi-Houthi confrontation returns
The current escalation can be traced partly to July, when Yemeni government forces struck the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. The aircraft diverted to Houthi-controlled Hodeidah, and the Houthis responded by firing missiles at Saudi Arabia, effectively ending four years of relative calm between the two sides.
Reuters later reported, citing Iranian and regional sources, that the aircraft carried personnel from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as well as missile- and drone-related equipment. A Houthi official rejected the allegations, maintaining that the passengers were civilians and denying that the movement functions as an Iranian proxy.
The confrontation widened sharply on Tuesday, when the Houthis launched drones and missiles at Khamis Mushait, Abha, Najran and Jizan in southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi authorities said 73 people, including women and children, were injured, and satellite imagery indicated fires at oil facilities in Jizan and Abha.
Riyadh promised measures to defend its territory, creating a difficult strategic choice for the Saudi leadership after years spent trying to disengage from Yemen’s war. A forceful response could reopen an expensive and inconclusive conflict, but continued restraint could encourage further Houthi attacks on Saudi cities, energy installations and shipping.
Risk of another prolonged war
Government-aligned forces are now better coordinated, active across several fronts and equipped with more sophisticated weapons than during earlier phases of the conflict. Nevertheless, the Houthis remain a disciplined fighting force with extensive combat experience, hardened defensive positions and the ability to strike targets far beyond Yemen’s borders.
The present offensive is consequently more likely to begin a prolonged struggle than produce the swift collapse of Houthi rule. Even the loss of territory would not necessarily eliminate the movement, which emerged in northern Yemen during the 1990s and draws much of its support from the Zaydi Shia population of the northern highlands.
The humanitarian consequences are already becoming visible, with at least 60 combatants and civilians reported killed during an earlier phase of the renewed fighting around Taiz and the western coast. Fresh displacement and damage to roads, ports and essential services could deepen a crisis in which millions of Yemenis remain dependent on humanitarian assistance.
What began as another round in Yemen’s unresolved civil war is therefore becoming part of a much larger confrontation stretching from Sanaa to Saudi oil installations and the international shipping lanes of the Red Sea. The outcome will affect not only the future political map of Yemen, but also regional energy security and the reliability of one of the principal trade routes connecting Asia, Africa and Europe.